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PROFESSOR CARNELL: The topic for this panel is "The
New Policy Agenda for Financial Services." There are a lot of
different ways to view the new policy agenda. Let me illustrate one
of them.
I think back to when I was leaving Washington after serving as
the Assistant Secretary of the Treasury.' A venerable lobbyist
from the securities industry, one of the "bicycle chain" guys who
helped head off the repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act ("Glass-
Steagall")y for many years, told me in all candor that he and his
Associate Professor, Fordham University School of Law.E xecutive Director, American Bankers Association Insurance Association and
American Bankers Association Securities Association.
"" Executive Vice President, Bank Supervision Group, Federal Reserve Bank of
New York.
.... President, New York Bankers Association.
.Deputy Staff Director, Committee on Banking and Financial Services, U.S.
House of Representatives.
1. Professor Carnell was the Assistant Secretary for Financial Institutions,
United States Department of the Treasury from 1993-1999.
2. The Glass-Steagall Act is the name commonly used to refer to Sections
16,20,21, and 32 of the Banking Act of 1933, Act of June 16,1933, ch. 89, 4S Stat.
162 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.) (partially repealed
1999). The Act was a vestige of The Great Depression Era. It separated banking
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colleagues were surprised that they were able to delay the repeal of
Glass-Steagall for five to ten years.' That was the most for which
they had hoped. He also hoped, as a professional lobbyist, that it
would have been enough work to help him put his kids through
college. In fact, the battle stretched out for over two decades. 4 He
later said, with a smile, that it actually helped put his grandchildren
through college.
I use that background to underscore the point that, for the past
two decades, the Congressional financial services agenda has been
dominated to a large extent by the unfinished business of dealing
with restrictive financial services legislation. The agenda has been
from the securities business by, generally, preventing banks from issuing,
underwriting, selling or distributing securities, either directly or through affiliates.
Helen A. Garten, Regulatory Growing Pains. A Perspective On Bank Regulation
In A Deregulatory Age, 57 FORDHAM L. Rav. 501,510 (1989); see also Norman S.
Johnson, Securities Regulation After Glass-Steagall Reform, Speech by SEC
Comm'r at SEC Speaks in 2000, Washington, D.C., at
http://www.sec.gov/news/speeches/spch353.htm (Mar. 3, 2000) (last visited Oct.
29, 2000) (explaining that Glass-Steagall provided that a financial entity could
engage in securities underwriting or commercial banking, but not both).
3. See Larry Black, Archaic Market Rules Finally Go, SUNDAY Bus, Oct. 24,
1999 ("The American financial community has been trying to repeal the 1933
Glass Steagall Act almost from the day it was adopted."). However, serious
efforts within Congress began in 1979. See Competition in the Financial Services
Industry and H.R. 10, The Financial Services Act of 1999: Hearing Before the Fin.
& Hazardous Subcomm. of the House Commerce Comm., 106th Cong. (1999)
(testimony of Alan Greenspan, Chair, Federal Reserve System). It was finally
overhauled by the passage of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Modernization
Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999) (codified in scattered sections of
12 and 15 U.S.C.). Gramm-Leach-Bliley generally allows financial service
providers, including banks, trust companies, insurance companies and broker-
dealers, to be affiliated through a holding company. See id. § 101 (repealing §§ 20
and 32 of the Glass-Steagall Act); §103 (amending § 1843 of the Bank Holding
Company Act of 1956, Pub. L. No. 84-511, 70 Stat. 133 (1956) (codified as
amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841-1850) to allow financial holding companies to
engage in and acquire interest in any company to be financial in nature).
4. Mike Doming and Frank James, Deal Done to Overhaul Banking Law;
Depression-Era Leash Nears Its End, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, Oct. 23, 1999
("Although Congress repeatedly has considered legislation to repeal the
Depression-Era laws since 1979, this was the first year [19991 a deregulatory
measure was passed by both the House and Senate.").
SYMPOSIUM
dominated by proposals to repeal the Glass-Steagall Act,, reform
the Bank Holding Company Act,' and relax geographic restrictions
on banks During these past tvo decades, a lot of other issues
affected the Congressional financial services agenda. We had the
thrift debacle,8 for example. The chronic, and among the larger,
5. 48 Stat. 162; see also H.R. 10, The Financial Services Act of 1999: Hearing
Before The House Comm. on Banking and Frn. Serv., 106th Cong. 1 (1999)
(statement of Michael Patterson, Vice Chairman, J.P. Morgan, Inc. and
Chairman of the Financial Services Council) [hereinafter Statement of Michael
Patterson] (arguing that there was consensus by most financial firms, their
customers, and policymakers that the Glass-Steagall Act's restrictions were
antiquated).
6. Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, Pub. L No. 84-511, 70 Stat. 133
(1956) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1341-1850). The Bank Holding
Company Act originally sought to close a loophole present in the Glass-Steagall
Act. Before the adoption of the Bank Holding Company Act, Glass-Steagall was
circumvented via the creation of bank holding companies, which engaged in both
commercial and investment banldng. The Bank Holding Company Act, in
essence, prevented bank holding companies from engaging in activities in which
banks could not engage. For more background on this correction by Congress
and generally on The Bank Holding Company Act, see Note, National Banks and
the Brokerage Business: The Comptroller's New Reading of the Glass-Steagall Act,
69 VA. L. RBv. 1303, 1310 (1983) (stating same); see also Susan Sirota Gaetano,
Note and Commentary, An Overview of Financial Services Reform 199s, 5 CON.
INS. LJ. 793, 797-813 (1998) (discussing financial services reform proposals,
including reform of the Bank Holding Company Act).
7. See Riegle-Neil Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994,
Pub. L. No. 103-328, 10S Stat. 2338 (1994) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 7, 12, and 31 U.S.C.) (amending the Bank Holding Company Act of
1956, 12 U.S.C. 1842(d), to allow mergers between banks in different states); see
also Bernard Shull and Lawrence J. White, A Symposium On The Changes In
Banking, With Implications For Antitrust, 45 ANTrTRUST BULL. 553 (2000)
[hereinafter Shull and Whitel (discussing the erosion of geographic
compartmentalization in banldng).
8. The "thrift debacle" generally refers to the two savings and loans
("S&L") crises respectively occurring during the 1970's and 19S0"s. For
background on these events, see William H. Starbuck and P. Narayan Pant,
Trying to Help S&L's: How Organizations with Good Intentions Jointly Enacted
Disaster, in Organizational Decision Maldng 35-60 (Z. Shapira ed., Cambridge
University Press 1996) [hereinafter Starbuck and Pant], available at
httpvilwww.stem.nu.edu-wstarbucsltrying.html (last visited Oct. 29, 20100)
(offering a brief history of the S&L Industry and a sur'ey of theories on the S&L
crises); see also Peter P. Swire, Bank Insolvency Law Now That It Matters Again,
2001)
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agenda items, however, concerned loosening old, outmoded, and
restrictive legislation
Now that the agenda-you could say the 1980s-1990s agenda,
or the 1980s agenda that went into the 1990s-has to a large degree
been achieved, what is next on the financial services policy agenda?
Going back to the kids-in-school example, you could, as a figure of
speech, say that one's own kids have grown up and gone off to
college. Is there going to be an eerie silence in the house? What
are people going to do next in the financial services policy debates?
Here, to help respond to those questions and to commence a
larger debate, are Laurie Schaffer of the House Committee on
Banking and Financial Services, William Rutledge of the Federal
Reserve Bank of New York, Michael Smith of the New York
Bankers Association, and Beth Climo of the American Bankers
Association Securities Association and American Bankers
Association Insurance Association.
The first person to whom I want to give an opportunity to
speak is Laurie Schaffer. Ms. Schaffer is Deputy Staff Director of
the House Committee on Banking and Financial Services. She is
an alumna of the Fordham University School of Law. Ms. Shaffer
has worked, over the years, at the Securities and Exchange
Commission, the American Bankers Association, the Treasury
Department, and the Federal Reserve Board. In fact, she has
worked on financial services issues since the 1980s. I met Ms.
Shaffer in 1998, when she was dealing with devising the
predecessor to what became Title II of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley
42 DUKE L.J. 469, 480 (1992) [hereinafter Swirel (discussing, in part, the effects of
the thrift failures of the 1980s on the bank insolvency regime); Anthony C.
Providenti, Jr., Note, Playing with FIRREA, Not Getting Burned: Statutory
Overview of the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of
1989, 59 FORDHAM L. REV. 323, 324 (1991) [hereinafter Providenti] (discussing
factors leading to crisis in thrift industry).
9. See Statement of Michael Patterson, supra note 5 (stating that restrictive
financial legislation was "designed in response to a marketplace that no longer
exists"). This old, outmoded legislation included the Glass-Steagall Act, §§ 16,
20, 21, and 32 of the Banking Act of 1933, 48 Stat. 162, (separating banking from
securities industry). It also included the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, 70
Stat. 133 (preventing bank holding companies from engaging in activities in
which banks could not engage).
SYMPOSIUM
Financial Services Modernization Act of 1999 ("Gramm-Leach-
Bliley")."' Ms. Schaffer, if you would, give us your initial thoughts.
MS. SCHAFFER: Thank you, Professor Carnell. Before I
begin, I provide this disclaimer: These are my own views and not
the views of the House of Representatives Banking and Financial
Services Committee or its Chairman, Congressman Jim Leach."
First, I feel duty-bound to defend the recent legislation. I want
to quickly touch on what the people working on Gramm-Leach-
Bliley' thought they were trying to achieve. For Congress, the
hallmark of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Modernization
Act is flexibility. The Act broadened permissible activities from
those closely relating to banking to those generally financial in
nature, directing the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System and the Department of Treasury to take into account such
factors as technological changes and the various other businesses
that compete with traditional financial companies."
Second, the legislation provided flexibility in structure-it
provided the choice between operating as a holding company and
operating as a financial subsidiary of a national bank." Regardless
10. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Modernization Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102,
113 Stat. 1338 (1999) (codified in scattered sections of 12 and 15 U.S.C.). Title II
of Gramm-Leach-Bliley deals with functional regulation of brokers and dealers,
bank investment company activities, and Securities and Exchange Commission
supervision of bank holding companies. See id.
11. Jim Leach (Republican, 1st Dist., Io.) is the Banking and Financial
Services Committee Chairman for the House of Representatives. See
httpilwww.house.govlleachlwelcome.htm (last visited Mar. 21,2001).
12. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Services Modernization Act, Pub. L. No.
106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999) (codified in scattered sections of 12 and 15 U.S.C.).
13. Id
14. See id. § 729(a) (requiring the federal banking agencies to conduct a study
of banking regulations concerning the delivery of financial services, including
"regulations that may assume that there will be person-to-person contact during
the course of a financial services transaction," and requiring such agencies to
"report their recommendations on adapting those existing requirements to online
banking and lending"); § 729(b) (requiring that the federal banking agencies
submit a report to Congress on the findings, conclusions, and recommendations
resulting from the study required under § 729(a), "before the end of the 2-year
period beginning on the date of the enactment of this Act").
15. Id. § 103 (allowing financial holding companies to engage in and acquire
interest in any company to be financial in nature); § 121 (authorizing national
20011
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of what your views were on the debate between the Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency ("OCC") 6 and the Federal Reserve,17
Gramm-Leach-Bliley8 put into law, for the first time, a clearly
authorized and operating subsidiary system."' For instance, there
were significant questions raised, and a lively debate ensued, as to
the legality of some of what the OCC had previously done.'
Gramm-Leach-Bliley clearly takes away any of that potential
litigation risk. It clearly set up the operating subsidiary as a
structure that can be used if banks feel that is the best manner to
banks to conduct in subsidiaries certain activities that are financial in nature).
16. The OCC is an independent bureau of the Department of the Treasury.
It charters, regulates, and supervises all national banks. The OCC also supervises
the federal branches and agencies of foreign banks and serves as a director of the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). See
http://www.occ.treas.gov/AboutOCC.htm (last visited Oct. 20,2000).
17. The OCC-Federal Reserve debate is rooted in the broad powers
provided in the Twentieth Century to banks by the OCC, which allowed banks to
sell various financial products, such as insurance. Before the passage of Gramm-
Leach-Bliley, banks were generally restricted from engaging in such activities.
See sources cited supra notes 2 and 3 (providing the historical statutory
limitations). The OCC, however, loosely interpreted provisions of the financial
regulatory laws and garnered significant victories in the courts, resulting in the
engagement of banks in the sale of certain financial products, especially certain
types of insurance, if such sales were deemed incidental to the business of
banking. Leigh Rademacher, Banking Law Symposium: Powers of National
Banks to Sell Insurance, Annuities and Securities from Bank Premises, 30
CREIGHTON L. R. 753, 754-55 (1997) [hereinafter Rademacher]. The OCC-
Federal Reserve conflict flowed into the debates about the organizational
structure that Gramm-Leach-Bliley proposed. See Clyde Mitchell, Operating
Subsidiaries-The Current Debate, 221 N.Y. L.J. 3 (1999) (discussing, in part, the
debate concerning the extent to which banks should be able to conduct activities
in operating subsidiaries owned by them, as opposed to through affiliates that are
subsidiaries of their holding companies); see also Jaret Seiberg, Changes in Regs
Hang Fire as Congress Debates Reform, AM. BANKER, Mar. 5, 1999, available at
1999 WL 6033164 (discussing the compromises made by banking agencies,
including the Federal Reserve Board, during the financial services reform debate
by Congress).
18. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Services Modernization Act, Pub. L. No.
106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999) (codified in scattered sections of 12 and 15 U.S.C.).
19. Id. § 121(a) (allowing national banks to, generally, control a financial
subsidiary or hold an interest in a financial subsidiary).
20. See Rademacher, supra note 17.
SYMPOSIUM
offer services.'
Third, the legislation attempted-and this probably will have
to be worked on further in the future-to adopt a principle of
functional regulation. It tries to streamline holding company
supervision to make the presence of the government less
burdensome. We heard talk today about all the regulators that
various holding companies could potentially have?' There is truth
to that, I believe, and I am not going to say otherwise. The
regulators could be the insurance regulators, the state securities
regulators, the Federal Reserve regulators, et cetera. With
Gramm-Leach-Bliley,7 however, there is an attempt to have one
functional regulator of the financial entity." There is an attempt to
have the Federal Reserve operate as the umbrella regulator, but to
rely on the functional regulators of the subsidiaries to do the
examinations of the subsidiaries themselves Therefore, this
recent legislation was really a first step towards trying to make this
21. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Services Modernization Act, Pub. § 121.
22. See Symposium, Panel I. The Busineys Aspects, Strategic Planning For
Financial Institutions in a New Legal and Economic Environment, 6 FORDHAM J.
CORP. & FIN. L. 23,37 (2001).
23. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Services Modernization Act, Pub. L. No.
106-102,113 Stat. 1338 (1999) (codified in scattered sections of 12 and 15 U.S.C.).
24. Id. § 111 (amending §5(c) of the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956,70
Stat. 133) (stating that the Board of Governors may make examinations of a
functionally regulated subsidiary of a bank holding company only if the Board of
Governors has (1) reasonable cause to believe that such subsidiary is engaged in
activities that pose a material risk to an affiliated depository institution; (2) the
Board reasonably determines from reports that examination of the subsidiary is
necessary to adequately inform the Board of the systems for monitoring and
controlling financial and operational risks w ithin the holding company that may
pose a threat to the safety and soundness of any depository institution subsidiary
of the holding company;, or, (3) based on reports and other available information,
the Board has reasonable cause to believe that a subsidiary is not in compliance
vith Gramm-Leach-Bliley or any other federal law that the Board of Governors
has specific jurisdiction to enforce against such subsidiary, including provisions
relating to transactions vith an affiliated depository institution, and the Board
cannot make such determination through examination of the affiliated depository
institution or the bank holding company).
25. See id. § 115(a) ("[A] federal bank agency may not inspect or examine
any registered investment company that is not a bank holding company or a
savings and loan company.")
2001]
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concept work. Further work may be needed, but this was certainly
the first step in what was intended.
I want to touch briefly on privacy, too, before I turn to what I
see as emerging legislatively in the future. The privacy provisions
in Gramm-Leach-Bliley were a very, very significant and important
part of the bill.' I agree with what Oliver Ireland said about the
free market working. This legislation was an attempt to give
people the information that they needed to make choices about
sharing their private information. A lot of what was heard during
the debates on the legislation, for example, about what was going
on to some extent with the US West,' was that people just did not
know that their personal information would be shared. If people
want to make the choice of using an institution that shares
information, then that is fine. I think, however, what people were
most surprised about is that they just did not know, or they did not
realize, that their personal information would be shared. Maybe
they should have been aware and they just did not think about it.
Gramm-Leach-Bliley' was, in fact, really an attempt to provide
people with such information. Privacy issues are very, very
complicated issues. If extreme measures are taken, for example,
people end up with unintended consequences. There was a lot of
effort in Gramm-Leach-Bliley' to try to ensure that the legislation
did not affect the free flow of credit." These are just not easy
issues with which to deal.
I find it sort of humorous that people talk about what has
26. Id. §§ 501-510 (regulating disclosure of nonpublic personal information)
and §§ 521-527 (regulating fraudulent access to financial information).
27. U.S. West, Inc. v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 182 F.3d 1224 (10th
Cir. 1999) (holding, inter alia, that the FCC failed to show that its regulations,
which generally required telecommunications companies to obtain customers'
approval before company could use customers' propriety information for
marketing purposes, directly and materially furthered FCC's interests in privacy
and increased competition).
28. Granmm-Leach-Bliley Financial Services Modernization Act, Pub. L. No.
106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999) (codified in scattered sections of 12 and 15 U.S.C.).
29. Id.
30. Gramm-Leach-Bliley, Pub. L. No. 106-102, § 502, 113 Stat. 1338
(providing financial institutions several options with respect to sharing the
nonpublic personal information of their customers).
SYMPOSIUM
occurred in Europe." From my standpoint, the United States has
done a very good job of protecting people's personal information,
with respect to the government having access-for example, the
Right to Financial Privacy Act' and other provisions-whereas, in
Europe they are protecting citizens' privacy against businesses, but
not against the government having access to its citizens' personal
information.' From my personal standpoint, I prefer to limit the
availability of personal information to the government than to limit
it to businesses. Maybe that is an American standpoint. In short, I
think the European example works, but only to a certain extent.
Having said that, let me touch briefly on some of the things, in
terms of an agenda for financial services, that people on Capital
Hill are contemplating and discussing. One of the first issues is
deposit insurance. The Federal Depository Insurance Corporation
(the "FDIC") is going to hold some seminars across the country, in
order to look at deposit insurance issues and how the deposit
insurance system works. 4  When people refer to the Gramm-
Leach-Bliley bill"' as being a "bank-centric" bill, in that there is
some truth. It is bank-centric, in part, because the U.S.
Government stands behind banks, since they have the full faith and
31. See Joel R Reidenberg, Resolving Conflicting International Data Privacy
Rules in Cyberspace, 52 STAN. L. REv. 1315, 1318 (2000) [hereinafter
Reidenberg] (stating that while the U.S. has a market-dominated approach to the
protection of personal information and only provides limited legal rights to
information privacy, Europe reflects a rights-dominated approach and it now
requires each of its Member States to have thorough statutory protections for
citizens.).
32. See 12 U.S.C. § 3412, § 3412(a) (2000) (stating that financial records shall
not be transferred by a government agency to another government agency unless
the transferring agency or department certifies in writing that there is reason to
believe the records are relevant to a legitimate law enforcement inquiry vithin
the receiving agency's or department's jurisdiction).
33. See generally Reidenberg, supra note 31 (discussing the legal protections
in the U.S. against government access to personal information and those afforded
in various European contexts).
34. Press Release, FDIC Chairman Announces Comprehensive Review of
Deposit Insurance System; Will Solicit Views From Industry and Consumer
Groups (Mar. 7,2000), at http:ll,v%,.v:.fdicgovnewsnewspresJ20lW0prO16.html
(last visited Apr. 5, 2001).
35. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Services Modernization Act, Pub. L. No.
106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999) (codified in scattered sections of 12 and 15 U.S.C.).
20011
122 FORDHAM JOURNAL OF CORPORATE & [Vol. VI
FINANCIAL LAW
credit of the U.S. Government,' The insurance companies and
securities firms do not have that feature. Securities firms have the
Securities Investment Protection Corporation Fund ("SIPC"),n
which is a different type of provision than the FDIC. That is, to a
large extent, why the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956"8 exists,
as well as other provisions related to financial institutions, because
of the function of deposit insurance.
There are proposals to both decrease deposit insurance and to
increase deposit insurance. The small banks have proposed
increasing deposit insurance to $200,000." There are also
proposals to give full insurance coverage to municipal deposits, so
that if, for example, New York City had all of its deposits in one
institution, those deposits, regardless of their size, would be
completely covered, which essentially means the United States is
backing all those municipal deposits. '
Thus, a lot of debate exists concerning the amount of
potentially allowable deposit insurance. You may have seen that
Merrill Lynch is offering to its customers to sweep their money into
insured accounts, as opposed to into money market funds. Merrill
is saying that they are going to offer $200,000 in coverage. Now,
36. See Competitive Equality Banking Act of 1987, Pub. L. 100-86, § 901, 101
Stat. 552 (1987) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12, 15, and 31
U.S.C.) ("[I]t is the sense of the Congress that it should reaffirm that deposits up
to the statutorily prescribed amount in federally insured depository institutions
are backed by the full faith and credit of the United States.").
37. The SIPC Fund is § 78ccc of the Securities Investor Protection Act of
1970, 15 U.S.C. § 78aaa (2000). The SIPC was established to maintain a fund for
customer protection by laying assessments on the annual revenues of its broker-
dealer members.
38. Banking Holding Company Act, Pub. L. No. 84-511, 70 Stat. 133 (1956)
(codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841-1850) (preventing bank holding
companies from engaging in activities in which banks could not engage); see also
Shull and White, supra note 7 (discussing amendment of the Bank Holding
Company Act by the Riegle-Neale Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency
Act of 1994).
39. C.f., Rob Blackwell, Crisis Haunts Deposit Insurance Reform, AM.
BANKER, Sept. 11, 2000, at 6 (discussing the reasoning behind opposition to an
increase in deposit insurance coverage).
40. See Tom Bengtson, Hartford-Carlisle, 185 Nw. FIN. REv.6 (2000),
available at 2000 WL 10508390 (discussing, in part, advantages and disadvantages
to giving full insurance coverage to municipal deposits).
SYMPOSIUM
they are doing that by sweeping the money into an insured
industrial loan company in Utah. When a customer reaches the
$100,000 limit there, then they are going to sweep it into a bank
they have in New Jersey. Therefore, there are a lot of issues that
cause the FDIC some concern, because these issues involve a
substantial sum of money that would flow into the Bank Insurance
Fund (BIF),' which would reduce its current capitalization. Thus,
there are a lot of issues concerning deposit insurance. I do not
think you will see any legislation this year-perhaps sometime in
2001-but it is something that is on the radar screen and it is
something about which people are beginning to talk.
Another issue concerns, and Ernie Patrikis touched on this in
an earlier panel, federal regulation of insurance. People again are
beginning to talk about a federal insurance charter. Where that
will go, I do not know. I know Ms. Climo is going to discuss this, so
I will not delve into this subject, but it is certainly an issue that is
relevant. Further, another issue that the Staff of the House
Banking Committee is beginning to look at and consider is
reviewing the interstate banking bill that was put into law in 1994.
It has been six years since that law was enacted. Nationvide
banking is a reality, and now we have Internet banks that are
operating across the country without any geographic restrictions.
As many of you who are familiar with interstate banking
know, states still can impose restrictions on de novo bank
branching (opening a new branch in a state)3 and there is
41. 12 U.S.C. § 1817(I)(3)(A) (2000) (stating that the Bank Insurance Fund
includes "[amny depository institution the deposits of which were insured by the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation on the day before the date of the
enactment of the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act
of 1989 [enacted Aug. 9,1989].. .") (brackets in original).
42. Riegle-Neil Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994,
Pub. L. No. 103-328, 108 Stat. 2338 (1994) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 7, 12, and 31 U.S.C.) (amending the Bank Holding Company Act of
1956, 12 U.S.C. § 1842(d) to allow mergers between banks in different states).
See generally Senate Passes Interstate Banking Bill After OTS Agrees To Take on
D & 0 Case, 63 BANiuNG REP. (BNA) 351 (1994) (discussing that after passage
of the interstate banking legislation, banks would be able to consolidate their
existing multi-state operations into branches).
43. Cf. 12 U.S.C. § 36(g)(1) (allowing the Comptroller of the Currency to
approve an application by a national bank to establish and operate a de novo
2001] 123
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consideration of whether it is time to really take another serious
look at interstate banking, in general, and at what changes need to
be made. The regulators have told us that there are some glitches
in the interstate banking bill' that need to be addressed, at a
minimum. But the real question is: given what has happened with
the Internet and nationwide banking, do we need to do sort of a
top-to-bottom review of how that statute'5 works? This is more of
a long-term project, but it is being considered.
Finally, something that is actually a near-term project and that
is in conference now between the House and the Senate is the e-
signature/e-records bill.' This is a bill that would essentially say
that electronic signatures and electronic records agreed to by both
parties can be used and will have the same legal effect as written
records of written documents. It is a very broad provision that
basically overrides all federal laws concerning the use of written
documents or written signatures. This bill, however, does not
override the content or timing of disclosures. Specifically, it deals
with how written signatures are delivered and used.
This is a bill in which the high-tech industry is very, very
interested. For instance, you may have seen that Microsoft is
creating software dealing with home mortgages. They are going to
be entering into partnerships with various financial institutions. In
branch in a State, other than the bank's home state, in which the bank does not
maintain a branch if there exists in the host State a law that (1) applies equally to
all banks; and, (2) such law expressly permits all out-of-State banks to establish
de novo branches in such State; and (3) certain other conditions of 12 U.S.C. § 36
are met.).
44. Riegle-Neil Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994,
Pub. L. No. 103-328, 108 Stat. 2338 (1994) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 7, 12, and 31 U.S.C.).
45. Id.
46. The Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act, Pub.
L. 106-229, 114 Stat. 464 (2000) (codified in 15 U.S.C. § 7001 and amending
provisions set out as a note under Section 231 of Title 47) (providing legal effect
to a signature, contract, or other record that is in electronic form and is in or
affects interstate or foreign commerce); see also Danielle Fugazy, Legislation:
Acceptance of E-Signatures Moves Ahead, WEB FIN., June 5, 2000, available at
2000 WL 4044381 (providing background on the Congressional debate
concerning e-signatures and passage of bill).
47. Id.
SYMPOSIUM
addition, a lot of banks are becoming more active in activities such
as on-line banking, wanting to offer mortgages and other services
on the Internet. That is something for which I think you will
actually see legislation enacted and signed by the President this
year. The House and the Senate are in conference on it now.
There are some issues concerning financial institution liability,
because the way the e-signature/e-records bill is drafted, it is
essentially a freestanding federal law with no federal agency having
any regulatory interpretation. That means that, unlike the Truth in
Lending Act,4 there are no safe harbor provisions. The Federal
Reserve, now, can adopt a rule saying "this is how you do it, and
you are safe if you do it within these confines." That is something
on which I know the conferees are going to be working. With that,
I will turn it back to Professor Carnell.
PROFESSOR CARNELL: Thank you, Ms. Schaffer.
Our next speaker is William Rutledge. He is Executive Vice
President for Bank Supervision at the Federal Reserve Bank of
New York. He is responsible for supervising all bank holding
companies, state member banks, and foreign banks in the New
York District. He is an economist by background. Mr. Rutledge
has a wealth of experience in bank supervision dating back to the
1970s, and we look forward to hearing his views.
MR. RUTLEDGE: Thank you, Professor Carnell.
As Professor Carnell mentioned, I am an economist by
training. I think I am one of the few non-lawyers on your program
today. As such, the focus of my comments will probably differ
from those of some of my confreres. I vill approach issues as a
bank supervisor, not as a lawyer. I will focus on provisions in
Gramm-Leach-Bliley ' that have a much stronger supervisory
overtone than the more regulation-oriented ones upon which many
of my colleagues have commented. I vAll also attempt to reach
48. 15 U.S.C. § 1638, et seq. (2000). Section 1638(a) requires disclosures by
creditors to borrowers before credit is extended, Id. at § 163S(a).
49. A safe harbor provision in a statute, rule or regulation generally renders
protection to a person as long as efforts were made by such person to comply
with the law, even if such efforts to comply ultimately fail. See BLAcIK'S LAW
DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1991).
50. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Services Modernization Act, Pub. L. No.
106-102,113 Stat. 1338 (1999) (codified in scattered sections of 12 and 15 U.S.C.).
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beyond the statute and talk about a few changes that have occurred
in the financial services industry, changes that will portend some
further developments that are quite distinct from the old regime,
which was comprised of a heavy focus on deposit taking and
lending.
Presently, we see much more reaching out, particularly by the
major banking organizations, into derivatives activities, including
credit derivatives, securities underwriting, corporate advisory
activities, and asset securitization. Many banking organizations
have also decided that they even want to get away from this core
set of activities that are credit-related and move much more into
the processing businesses and be involved in custody or asset
management in the pursuit of fee income. Further, numerous
banking organizations have started to explore the potential of
banking on the Internet ("e-banking"). These various
developments have led to some fundamental changes in the way in
which we supervise banking organizations. They also have led to
some prospective changes in the overall capital adequacy approach
to banking organizations, much of that work being done by the
Basel Supervisors Committee (the "Basel Committee"). 1
Touching briefly on the immediate impact of Gramm-Leach-
Bliley32 on our bank supervisory process here, I think the
conventional wisdom was that the new statute, in terms of the
powers side, was largely directed to the biggest banking
organizations. What developed, however, is that numerous smaller
organizations see some opportunities here as well. If you look at
the first set of filers to become financial holding companies, more
than two-thirds of those filers were banking organizations under $1
billion in total assets.' Much of their interest relates to getting
51. The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision [hereinafter Basel
Committee] is a forum for discussing specific international banking supervisory
problems. "It coordinates the sharing of supervisory responsibilities among
national authorities in respect of banks' foreign establishments with the aim of
ensuring effective supervision of banks' activities worldwide." See generally
http://www.bis.org/about/profil200O.htm (last visited Apr. 5, 2001).
52. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Services Modernization Act, Pub. L. No.
106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999) (codified in scattered sections of 12 and 15 U.S.C.).
53. See Dean Anason, Fed to Approve 100 'Holding Company' Applications,
AM. BANKER, March 10, 2000, at 1 (indicating that Federal Reserve Chairman
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involved in insurance agency activities more readily, perhaps
getting more involved into merchant banking. I think the statute is
likely to result in relatively few of the Citigroup-type combinations
of major commercial banking, insurance underwriting, and
securities underwriting activities. There may be a few, but not
terribly many. I say this for a couple of reasons.
On the commercial banking securities side, as many of you
may know, the Federal Reserve Bank has liberalized what the rules
were under the previous statute, in terms of Section 20 activities,,
and upgraded the percentage limit of ineligible revenue, if you will,
which in effect allowed for the acquisition by commercial bank
holding companies of numerous securities firms. Therefore, some
of the prime targets for a prospective merger or acquisition by
banking organizations have already been taken over by
commercial bank holding companies, even prior to this statute.
On the insurance side, I believe, there too, we may not see a
tremendous number of affiliations between banks and insurance
companies, at least immediately. It is not clear to me how strong
the synergies may be between commercial banking and insurance
underwriting. I also wonder whether most commercial bank
holding companies will be satisfied with the rate of return that
insurance companies have traditionally been able to generate.
Further, difficulties will occur structurally in that many insurance
companies are still in mutual form so, prior to acquisition, they will
have to go through the process of de-mutualization'
Alan Greenspan stated that, "[t]wo-thirds of the requests for financial holding
companies were filed by companies with less than $I billion of assets..."); we
also Eric Winig, Financial Holding Company Structure Not for Giants Only, Ai.
BANKER. March 31, 2000, at 7 ("Of the 144 financial holding companies
approved by the Federal Reserve Board, more than two-thirds are banking
companies with less than $1 billion of assets.").
54. Glass-Steagall Act, Section 20 of the Banking Act 1933, Act of June lb.
1933, ch. 89, 48 Stat. 162 (codified in 12 U.S.C.) (repealed 1991). Section 20 of
the Glass-Steagall Act provided, "[No member bank shall be affiliated ... vith
any corporation... [or] association... engaged principally in the issue... of
stocks, bonds, debentures, notes, or other securities ... " Id.
55. De-mutualization is a process where a mutual insurance company
converts into a stock insurance company. Generally. the mutual policyholders'
ownership interest in the old company is converted into ownership interest in the
form of stock in the new company. The process is usually the result of a need to
20011
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I think, over time, in any event, we will see a growth in
affiliations between financial institutions and we will certainly see
an opening up of the range of opportunities for financial services
organizations. Whether those financial services organizations want
to try to be all things to all people and be very diversified, or
whether they want to be very focused and specialized, the Gramm-
Leach-Bliley Act56 will open an increased range of opportunities in
either of those dimensions.
In terms of the new legislation's direct effect on the
supervisory process, let me make a couple of comments. It was
alluded to earlier that the statute does introduce the concept of
umbrella supervision, with the Federal Reserve Bank being the
umbrella supervisor for the overall financial holding company, and
with a second tier of supervisors, the functional regulators of the
individual non-bank firms. The Act requires the Federal Reserve
Bank, as umbrella supervisor, to rely very heavily on the functional
regulators. For example, it relies to the fullest extent possible on
publicly available information,' externally audited financial
statements,5 and information submitted to the functional
regulators,5 9 rather than seeking information directly from the
firm.0
As umbrella supervisor, the Federal Reserve Bank is expected
to be principally concerned with understanding group-wide risk
management and internal controls and consolidated capital
adequacy. That is a tricky process. The Federal Reserve is in the
process of defining the appropriate rules of approach. We are also
raise capital and to compete in the increasingly diversified financial markets.
Unum Corp. v. United States, 130 F.3d 501,502 (1st Cir. 1997).
56. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Services Modernization Act, Pub. L. No.
106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999) (codified in scattered sections of 12 and 15 U.S.C.).
57. Id. § 111 (amending the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, 12 U.S.C.
1844(5)(c)).
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. ("In the event that the Board requires a report under this subsection
from a functionally regulated subsidiary of a bank holding company of a kind
that is not required by another Federal or State regulatory authority or an
appropriate self-regulatory organization, the Board shall first request that the
appropriate regulatory authority or self-regulatory organization obtain such
report."). Id.
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expected to be looking into intra-group transactions, particularly
ones that could have deleterious effects on the depository
institution. We are also expected to be looking into payment
system risk issues.
The focus of umbrella supervision, as the statute directs, is
actually quite consistent with the approach we have taken as a
supervisor of bank holding companies in recent years. We have
become, within the Federal Reserve, much more focused on a top-
down approach, focusing on how processes are managed within the
banking organization, in order to be more risk-focused and
process-oriented in our overall approach to supervision. By
process-oriented, I mean that our examiners have been looking at
the risk management processes and internal controls at an
organization, rather than looking to do point-in-time assessments
of financial conditions and performance. Those can change quickly
in today's environment. We expect our examiners to conduct
reviews that cut across corporate entities, to focus on business lines
or risk areas in banking as well as various non-banking areas.
Another focus of our approach as bank holding company
supervisor, that I think will carry over very well as financial holding
company supervisor, is that we are looking to do all we can to
encourage banking organizations, now financial services firms, to
upgrade the quality of their own risk management systems. We are
trying to encourage organizations to improve their own managerial
systems, rather than trying to "hard-wire" a lot of regulatory
processes and expectations on banking organizations. We are
trying to do that with the various supervisory steps that we are
taking through the examinations process. We are also trying to do
that working through the Basel Committee"' in overall approaches
to capital adequacy. The Basel Committee, of which I just became
a member, has focused in recent years, for example, in its market
risk amendment, 2 on trying to build upon the models that banking
61. See Basel Committee, supra note 51.
62. AMENDMENT TO THE CAPITAL ACCORD TO INCORPORATE N tRKEr
RISKS (January 1996), at http:Aww, .bis.org/publfbebs24a.htm (last visited Apr. 5.
2001) (providing a detailed account of the methodology put forth by the Basle
Committee to set capital requirements for market risks and describing two
alternative approaches to the measurement of market risk: a standardized
method and an internal models approach); sce also MODIFICATIONS '1O THE
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organizations have used to manage their own market risk exposure
and on managing how they allocate capital in support of that
market risk. 3
In a recent consultative paper' the Basel Committee advanced
the notion a step further and said, "Let's look at the way banking
organizations look at credit risk issues. How do they allocate
capital internally? How do they rate credits risks internally? Can
we use this internal ratings approach much more as a basis for a
capital adequacy regime that stretches out to include gradations of
credit risk as well?"'65 Thus, Gramm-Leach-Bliley," as I mentioned,
creates some challenges for banking organizations and for
supervisors, but is, simultaneously, quite consistent with a lot of
recent trends within the banking industry and trends in our
approach to supervision, in any event.
PROFESSOR CARNELL: Thank you, Mr. Rutledge.
Our next speaker is Michael Smith. He is President of the
New York Bankers Association (the "NYBA").67 Mr. Smith
played a crucial role in the development of the Gramm-Leach-
Bliley Act.' In 1998, he led a task force that negotiated
compromise on issues involving bank insurance activities. These
MARKET RISK AMENDMENT. TEXTUAL CHANGES TO THE AMENDMENT TO THE
BASLE CAPITAL ACCORD OF JANUARY 1996 (September 1997), at
http:f/www.bis.org/publ/bcbs24a.pdf (last visited Apr. 5, 2001). See generally
http://www.bis.org (last visited Apr. 5, 2001) (detailing the proposal of a new
Basel Capital Accord).
63. Id.
64. A NEW CAPrrAL ADEQUACY FRAMEWORK (June 1999), at
http://www.bis.org/publfbcbs50.pdf (last visited Apr. 5, 2001) (consisting of three
"pillars": minimum capital requirements, a supervisory review process, and the
effective use of market discipline, and introduced to replace the 1988 Basel
Capital Accord).
65. See id.
66. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Services Modernization Act, Pub. L. No.
106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999) (codified in scattered sections of 12 and 15 U.S.C.).
67. See New York Bankers Association (NYBA) web page, at
http://www.nyba.com/pages..about/about.html (last visited Apr. 5, 2001) (stating
that the NYBA is New York State's primary trade organization for the banking
industry and that it promotes sound but progressive fiscal policies that advance
commercial and community interests as well as individual initiative).
68. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Services Modernization Act, Pub. L. No.
106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999) (codified in scattered sections of 12 and 15 U.S.C.).
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were issues that had destroyed prior versions of the legislation in
1998, 1995, and 1991-and this is probably not an exhaustive list of
the years in which fatal terminations occurred-and divisiveness on
these issues had also come close to bringing down Gramm-Leach-
Bliley6' in the House in 1998. So this task force achieved what
many believed was impossible, that is, a negotiated agreement that
had substantial support in both the banking and insurance
industries.
MR. SMITH: Thank you, Professor Carnell.
I want to comment on Mr. Rutledge's and Ms. Schaffer's
remarks and then give you just a brief overview of where we, the
NYBA, view the situation.
My first reaction is to the earlier commentary about where the
industry stands today. The NYBA represents about 140 banks in
New York State, from the smallest to the largest. I say, as we talk
about this law and we look at it in the broad sense-legal,
economic, and from the other perspectives that were discussed
today the industry is just starting to cope with Gramm-Leach-
Bliley." It is an extensive law, it is a comprehensive law, and we
forget sometimes that its effects are not going to surface
immediately.
In addition, the industry is in a state of consolidation. I agree
with Mr. Rutledge, that what we are seeing now is that, while many
people talked-to some extent ad nauseam-about how this was a
"big bank bill" and was a financial center or money center bill,
what we have seen so far is a lot of activity by our smaller
institutions, especially in the insurance agency area, where there
have been acquisitions of insurance agencies across the United
States!'
69. Id.
70. Id
71. See, eg., Andrew Ward, First Union Agrees to Purchase Tribus: New Unit
to Sell Insurance to Business Clients, THE RECoRD, Aug. 22, 200D, available at
2000 WL 15827797 (describing the purchase of an insurance company by the
"nation's sixth-largest bank"); see also Trevor Thomas, Canadian Bank To Buy
Liberty's Insurance Unit, NAT'L UNDERWRITER, June 26, 2000, available at 2000
WL 21309534 (stating that the passage of Gramm-Leach-Bliley made it possible
for the Royal Bank of Canada to make an acquisition of a U.S. insurance
company).
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And also, another area that we had identified early is title
insurance, which is another example of a micro issue that was not
discussed much during the legislative debate but has taken on
relevancy after the law has been signed. Further, Ms. Schaffer
mentioned in her prognosis a couple of "hot buttons" in the history
of banking over the last twenty years, one being branching and the
other is deposit insurance, along with the so-called issue of "too big
to fail." All of this is so broad and so controversial that we could
have a four- or five-day session on each one of those issues. In any
event, I will try to look at things in the macroeconomic sense as a
representative for the banking industry in New York, and I am an
advocate for that industry, as is Ms. Climo.
One thing that I have not heard so far is that this bill is a great
law.' It is a great law for New York, and it is certainly an
economic development bill and a jobs bill, because before you can
be a consumer, before you can do anything else, you have to have a
job. A half-million people directly owe their employment to the
financial services industry in New York today and, by our
estimates, another half-million jobs are directly related through the
legal profession, the advertising profession, or the communications
industry. That is a significant segment of the economy of this
state.73
What this law did was validate what had occurred before,
made sense out of it, and gave the institutions in the United States
and in the State of New York the ability to compete. At the same
time, which I think is very unfortunate, is the sense that the
72. See William W. Streeter, Keeping One Eye on the Horizon, ABA
BANKING J., Sept. 1, 2000, available at 2000 WL 12872855 (describing incoming
ABA President Don Mengedoth's endorsement of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley
Act); see also Debt and Government Sponsored Enterprises: Hearing Before the
Task Force on Hous. and Infra-structure of the House Budget Comm., 105th
Cong. (2000), available at 2000 WL 23832018 (statement of William C. Apgar,
HUD Designee to the Fed. Hous. Fin. Bd.) (articulating Apgar's endorsement of
the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act because it enhanced the Federal Home Loan
Bank's capacities).
73. See Wall Street, Consumer Services Fuel Job Gains in New York; Standard
& Poor's DRI Forecasts Continued Employment Growth In Empire State, Bus.
WIRE, July 19, 1999 (stating that business and financial services industries alone
account for 15% of New York State's total employment).
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consumer somehow loses due to this kind of legislation. In fact,
this legislation is pro-consumer. The privacy stipulations in
Gramm-Leach-Bliley were the broadest that had ever been
applied to an industry in the United States. And, as one who has
appeared before the New York Legislature on this issue, I can tell
you that this industry is taking that issue very seriously, as was
noted in the earlier panel.
What Professor Carnell said at the outset is very true. As
someone who has seen his entire career evolve over this twenty-
five-year span, this is a generation of work by thousands and
thousands of people, culminating in diligence and the perseverance
of Chairman Jim Leach,' and his colleagues. They held it together.
In the past, with regard to financial services, this country had a
checkerboard square of laws and regulations. It failed federal
efforts, and individual state action. If you practice or study the
banking law or have an interest in financial services in general, you
understand that the tension and the dynamics of the state and
federal system is absolutely unique in the United States through its
so-called dual banking system,' which has been preserved. The
dual banking system was very important in this effort, as was a very
active legal and regulatory system.
When one looks back over the last twenty-five years, one sees
that there existed individual actions on interstate banking, fee
deregulation and interest rate deregulation. One often forgets
about these actions. For example, in New York, there .as the
DeWind Commission on Insurance and Banking' and so-called
74. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Services Modernization Act, Pub. L. No.
106-102, §§ 501-510, 521-527, 113 Stat. 133' (1999) (detailing the privacy
provisions).
75. Id.
76. See source cited supra note 11.
77. See generally Timothy J. King, Insurers Should Get Dual Charter Systen
Like Banks', AM. BANKER, Apr. 28, 20010 [hereinafter King] (defining the dual
banking system as the competing state and national regulatory systems).
78. See William G. Blair, Cuomo Names 17 To Insurance Ilvestment Panel,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 1983, at 48 (discussing how the DeWind Commission
planned to examine a New York law which allowed insurance companies to make
riskier investments than in the past).
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Section 20," with which some of you are familiar. Further, we had
the thrift crisis,.' as Professor Carnell indicated, which was
significant because it delayed comprehensive reform for probably
four or five years. Finally, there was state intervention.
As to the future, my professional opinion is that the biggest
issue confronting the industry, besides getting up to speed and
dealing with all the regulations resulting from the new legislation
and the marketplace itself, is re-regulation. While a vibrant
economy currently exists, a lot of what we are seeing is happening
in one of the most robust markets in the history of the United
States. The United States and New York are in a very good
position right now. Obviously, we hope that this prosperity
continues. But, at the same time, you are seeing consumer interest
in a myriad of issues that are all related to the financial services
market, whether it is privacy, ATM fees, rate or fee deregulation,
or deregulation in general. These are all aspects of the financial
services market. As we go forward, I think we are going to see
escalating interest in greater regulation, and that will be a large
part of the NYBA agenda.
I refer briefly to the fact that we have in New York the "wild
card" statute8 that allows the state regulatory system to react
immediately to federal action.' It is a watershed law that was
passed three or four years ago in New York. What that meant for
New York is very simple: nine out of the top ten banks in the State
of New York are state-chartered.
Privacy has been discussed at length. Nevertheless, I
79. N.Y. CLS Bank § 20 (2001) ("In case of the insolvency or voluntary or
involuntary liquidation of any banking organization... all unpaid charges
lawfully assessed against it by the superintendent and all unpaid penalties and
forfeitures incurred by it under any section of this chapter shall be entitled to
priority of payment from its assets on an equality with any other priority given by
this chapter.").
80. See Starbuck and Pant, Swire, and Providenti, supra note 8.
81. See N.Y. CLS Bank § 14-g (1999) ("It is the intention of the legislature
.. to ensure that banks and trust companies may exercise the same rights and
powers and engage in the same activities as national banks... "); see also 2000
N.Y. ALS 418 (amending, in part, N.Y. CLS Bank § 14-g in regards to insurance
activities of banking organizations).
82. Id.
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completely agree with Ms. Schaffer's comments that the European
model is one that we should look at very seriously. Yet, at the
same time, we should recognize that the American system provides
the greatest democratic credit system in the world. By our
estimation, a domestic mortgage is 200 basis points lower on
average mortgages in Europe, due to the credit system that exists
in the United States. Other topics that we may discuss in the panel
include deposit insurance, issues concerning regulating ATMs, e-
banking, and the Community Reinvestment Act.' Finally, and I
think most importantly for those who study the system, there is this
very elaborate regulatory system that still exists in the United
States. People can say we should have a consolidated regulatory
system, but, so far, the complex regulatory scheme has worked well
for the United States. With the Federal Reserve Bank as an
umbrella organization, I think we can look forward to a good
system.
PROFESSOR CARNELL: Thank you, Mr. Smith.
Our next panelist is Beth Climo. Ms. Climo is Managing
Director of the American Bankers Association Securities
Association and the American Bankers Association Insurance
Association ("ABAIA"). These are separate affiliates of the
American Bankers Association, whose members are right at the
intersection between banking on the one hand and the securities
and insurance businesses on the other. Ms. Climo has had a
distinguished career working at Bingham Dana & Gould, and as
Senior Counsel for the Senate Banking Committee, as Director of
Legislative Affairs for the FDIC at a critical time during the thrift
debacle,' at a time, I would note, when the FDIC gained new
substantial powers and responsibilities. Most recently, she worked
for the Federal Housing Finance Board.
MS. CLIMO: I vill be brief. With financial modernization, at
least as a legislative matter, behind us, some of the things on which
83. Community Reinvestment Act of 1977,12 U.S.C. § 2901, § 2901(b) (2000)
("It is the purpose of this chapter to require each appropriate Federal financial
supervisory agency to use its authority when examining financial institutions, to
encourage such institutions to help meet the credit needs of the local
communities in which they are chartered consistent vith the safe and sound
operation of such institutions.").
84. See Starbuck and Pant, Sivire, and Providenti, supra note S.
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Congress will refocus, as Ms. Schaffer mentioned, are regulatory
and supervisory structural issues.
Now, one area quite ripe for that, as you heard from Ms.
Schaffer and from Ernie Patrikise before her, is the regulation of
insurance, which for more than fifty years has been reserved to the
states. Under the McCarran-Ferguson Act,' the regulation and
supervision of the insurance industry is done under a state-by-state
structure rather than through any federal entity.
The ABAIA represents the insurance operations of some of
the largest banks in the United States. More than a year ago, this
organization identified the state-by-state system of regulation as a
problem that should be addressed, and it developed a fairly
comprehensive proposal for an optional federal charterer and
regulator for the insurance industry.' Even though that proposal
was developed, the ABAIA decided to back-burner it because it
seemed to put the cart before the horse by addressing the
regulatory structure before the banking industry was fully
permitted to get into the insurance business. Therefore, the
federal charter proposal was back-burned. But, once Financial
Modernization via Gramm-Leach-Bliley '  was enacted, the
organization returned the proposal to the front burner and decided
to make it its top priority. ' Hence, one of the reasons I am here
before you today is to talk about that proposal. We think, at the
ABAIA, that federal chartering is the next logical step for the
insurance industry after financial modernization. It is a necessary
development in view of the nationalization, and even globalization,
85. See supra pp. 123; see also Symposium, Panel I: The Business Aspects,
Strategic Planning For Financial Institutions in a New Legal and Economic
Environment, 6 FoRDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 23, 28 (2001).
86. 15 U.S.C. § 1012, § 1012(b) (2000) ("No Act of Congress shall be
construed to invalidate, impair, or supersede any law enacted by any State for the
purpose of regulating the business of insurance... ").
87. See Steven Brostoff, Bank Group Proposes Federal Charter for Insurers,
NAT. UNDERWRITER, Jan. 1, 2001, at 2 [hereinafter Brostoff] (discussing the
ABAIA's continued efforts to propose an optional federal charter for insurance
companies).
88. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Fimancial Services Modernization Act, Pub. L. No.
106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999) (codified in scattered sections of 12 and 15 U.S.C.).
89. See Brostoff, supra note 87 and accompanying text.
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of the insurance business, and many other industries.
We do have a very detailed proposal. It is currently being put
into legislative form.' Although we by no means think we have the
ultimate wisdom on exactly how this should happen, we do think
that the process is encouraging dialogue among other large
insurance organizations that are looking at similar proposals. Our
plan certainly has caught the attention of the National Association
of Insurance Commissioners (the "NAIC") 1 and other insurance
commissioners. If nothing else, I think either the state insurance
regulation or the ABAIA vAill benefit at the state level from the
kind of pressures that these kinds of proposals impose.
I will make just two key points about the proposal, at least as
we have structured it. One is the focus on the word "optional."
This proposal does not supplant the state system but supplements
it. The proposed regulation plan is designed to work in tandem
with the state system. In other words, what it does is it gives
insurance companies, insurance agents, and brokers a choice of
regulator and supervisory system. The second important point, at
least, again, as our proposal is structured, is that the legislative plan
is closely patterned after the dual banking system,,' both in the
form of the proposal and in the contemplated benefits. For
example, three such features are:
(1) It would make the option of a federal charter available.
Under our proposal, there would actually be two options: a full
insurance option and one just for agents and brokers, consisting of
a complete charter which includes insurance underwriting.
90. See Two Banking and Insurance Groups Joining to Form New
Association, BEsrWiRE, Feb. 20, 2001 ("ABAIA has drafted a legislative
proposal to establish a structure similar to the federal system for regulating
banks. More than two years in the making, the draft vould give insurance
companies the option of being chartered and regulated by the federal
government or by an individual state.").
91. See generally, Gramm-Leach-Bliley Issues Top NAIC Agenda, Ir;s.
AccouNT., Mar. 13, 2000, at 1 [hereinafter NAIC Agenda] (discussing how the
NAIC, along with the insurance industry in general, is responding to financial
modernization); see also Miles Maguire, Sdiact Urges NAIC to Fix 'Identity
Crisis, PRIVATE PLACEiENT REP., May 22, 1995, at 8 (discussing whether the
NAIC is a private trade group or a public governmental entity).
92. See King, supra note 77 and accompanying text.
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The regulatory structure would include a federal
commissioner. Ours is patterned after the OCCn and the Office of
Thrifts Supervision (the "OTS"), which is a separate department
under the Treasury Department. Now, by no means was that the
only avenue. The other option was setting up an independent
agency, like the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Federal
Reserve Bank, or something similar, but we opted to go the route
of the OCC and the OTS. This proposed entity will be the
charterer, the regulator and the supervisor, again as the OTS and
the OCC are today.
The third leg of the proposal is the guarantee system. Again,
the federal guarantee system that we would put into place would
mirror the FDIC in a number of ways. For one, it would be
independent of the commissioner. In other words, it would be a
separate board that is not beholden to the administration. Further,
a majority of its members would be independent. Professor
Carnell remembers, as I do, how important we thought the
independence of the FDIC was in helping to work through the
thrift debacle in the late 1980s."'
As we have structured it, the proposal would guarantee all
insurance activities. We would keep the same types and levels of
coverage that exist under the state systems today, and would
additionally cover all insured activities, irrespective of whether
they are under a state charter, state regulatory system, or federal
system. Again, that mirrors the FDIC system today under the dual
banking system, where the FDIC is the insurer of both the state
banks and the federal banks.
A difference between our proposal and the current state
system is that the state system would no longer be "post-funded."
Now, if there is a failure and there is an insolvency, then the funds
are collected at that point from those that are part of that fund.
93. See source cited supra note 16.
94. The OTS is the primary regulator of all federal and many state-chartered
thrift institutions, including savings banks and savings and loan associations. It
was established in 1989 and replaced the Federal Home Loan Bank Board, which
had overseen the banking industry during the Thrift Debacle. See generally the
OTS web site at http:llwww.ots.treas.gov/default.cfm (last visited Oct. 19, 2000).
95. See Starbuck and Pant, Swire, and Providenti, supra note 8 and
accompanying text.
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Our concept, however, would pre-fund it-again, much like the
FDIC-and the risk would be spread much more broadly because
essentially all the insurance entities would be feeding into that
guarantee fund.
There are many benefits of the proposal. One is the virtue of
modeling the dual banking system. The dual banking system, we
believe, has served the banking industry well for more than 140
years." It is very strong. Even though there has been the federal
charter option for 140 years, two-thirds of the institutions-although
I think only about half of the assets-continue to be under a state
charter, as opposed to a federal charter. I would like to say that
Mr. Smith, in fact, made my case very well when he said that nine
of the ten top banks in New York continue to be state-chartered
banks. The benefits of the proposal are self-evident. The proposal
is beholden to the banking industry for bringing this forward
because the banking industry has experienced this, where
independent insurance companies have not operated under a
similar system. But, in fact, all those benefits can be brought to
bear on the insurance business over the long run if this sort of
proposal is enacted.
PROFESSOR CARNELL: Thank you, Ms. Climo.
I will put a series of questions to the panelists, some of them
designed to be provocative, but most of them designed to be
susceptible to short answers, not that short answers would do
entire justice to the subject matter, but when does one do entire
justice anyway?
What potential policy issue or proposal should financial
services firms fear the most over the next five years? MS. CLIMO:
To use one term-we had a big panel on it before-I vll say
privacy regulation. Is that short enough?
PROFESSOR CARNELL: Absolutely.
MS. CLIMO: And I do not mean the regulations coming out
of the fairly extensive privacy rules that are in Gramm-Leach-
Bliley,' but additional layers of privacy regulation. Probably, the
96. See King, supra note 77 (arguing that the dual banking system has been a
success for 140 years and a similar system should be applied to the insurance
industry).
97. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Services Modernization Act, Pub. L. No.
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new policy rules would create among states a patchwork of
protections and disclosures that would be impossible for a
consumer to navigate through, which I think is a real threat not
only to institutions, but also to consumers.
MS. SCHAFFER: I agree with Ms. Climo. I think, Joel
Reidenberg's prior presentation,98 demonstrated some of the issues
and the debate that occurs in this area. Privacy becomes a very
emotional issue. It becomes an issue that is difficult to keep
"contained," although I doubt "contained" is the right word,
because I think everybody supports privacy. The question is, what
is all the controversy about? When you look at polls and you look
at different types of information on the issue, you get various
responses. Everybody is in favor of privacy, but, as I think Carl
Felsenfeld pointed out, privacy regulation is sensitive. If people
are going to get certain benefits, maybe they are willing to have
certain information shared.
In some of the debates in Congress, people were talking about
getting catalogs from Victoria's Secret-I mean, this is what the
debate concerned in a Congressional committee-and who was
sharing their mail order information and how embarrassed they
were. It is a debate that takes a life of its own. In fact, pending
bipartisan legislation seeks to establish a commission to study the
issues and address privacy questions- not just financial industry
ones, dealing with information on one's side, but issues that involve
driver's licenses, social security numbers and all sorts of privacy
issues. The pending legislation's goal is to try to come up with only
one recommendation.' I think that makes a lot of sense.
MR. SMITH: Certainly privacy protection presents a problem,
from the NYBA's point of view. For one, Congress specifically
106-102, §§ 501-510, 521-527,113 Stat. 1338 (1999).
9& See Symposium, Panel II: The Policy Aspect, Consumer Data Privacy, 6
FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 69, 96-105 (2001) (laying out the issues of banks
sharing account balances with third parties and banks notifying that they will be
disclosing private information to its affiliates).
99. Congress passed privacy legislation on August 9, 2000, Pub. L. 106-102,
113 Stat. 1437 (codified as 15 U.S.C. § 6802). See 15 U.S.C. § 6802(b)(1)(A)-(c)
(stating that a financial institution may not disclose nonpublic personal
information to a nonaffiliated third party unless notice is given to the customer
and other requirements are met).
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reserved certain powers to the statesY. Moreover, there certainly
is an interest by the public on this topic, as witnessed by the article
on the front page of the New York Times today."' Every week for
the last three or four months, there has been some story dealing
with privacy, whether it is about DoubleClick - or someone else.
Privacy is a fundamental issue in the industry, in the near and
distant future.
In addition, as one who talks to the media and consumer
groups frequently, I say that another vital issue for the industry is
pricing regulation with the one exception dealing with mortgages,
passed by the Congress in 19802"3 In that piece of legislation,
Congress overrode state usury statutes on mortgages." But this
issue may also be in the State purview, as mortgage laws are still
regulated by the States to a great extent. And, irrespective of the
court cases and the OCC's authority as to ATM fees, for example,
the States still have the right to action, and we spend a great deal of
our time talking about that. Now fee regulation does not just affect
banking, it affects the securities and insurance industries, as well as
100. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Services Modernization Act, Pub. L. No.
106-102, § 507(a), 113 Stat. 1338 (1999) (stating that Gramm-Leach-Bliley does
not supersede State statute, regulation, order or interpretation, unless such is
inconsistent with Gramm-Leach-Bliley, and only to the extent of the
inconsistency); see also id. § 507(b) (allowing the States to provide greater
protection than that in Gramn-Leach-Bliley).
101. Timothy L. O'Brien, Officials Worried Over a Sharp Rise in Identity
Theft, N.Y. TaMms, Apr. 3,2000, at Al (stating that law enforcement officials and
consumer advocates warn that the crime of identity theft is growing, especially on
the Internet).
102. See generally http't/wvw.doubleclick.net/us!corporatelaboutloveniew.asp
(last visited Apr. 5,2001) (providing an overview of the company).
103. Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act, Pub. L.
No. 96-161, 93 Stat. 1233 (1979) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12
U.S.C.).
104. Id. § 105 (overriding provisions in constitutions or laws of any State
expressly limiting the rate or amount of interest, discount points, or other charges
which may be charged, taken, received, or reserved which applied to any loan,
mortgage, or advance which was "(A) secured by a first lien on residential real
property or by a first lien on stock in§ a residential cooperative housing
corporation where the loan, mortgage, or advance [,vas] used to finance the
acquistion [sic] of such stock; (B) made after the date of enactment of this Act;
and (C) described in section 527(b) of the National Housing Act").
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other financially related industries. Thus, fee regulation and
privacy are the two most troublesome issues, in my opinion.
MR. RUTLEDGE: Just to add more of a concept, rather than
a specific prospective piece of legislation, I think an area about
which bankers and financial services people should be particularly
concerned is the possibility of overreaction on the part of Congress
or State legislators to a particular adverse development within the
banking industry.
I believe we have a system right now in which there is enough
complexity and enough new areas to cause organizations that get
involved to experience some hiccups. When those hiccups occur,
will there be a visceral reaction to try to cure that through the
legislative process, or will there be a recognition that a lot of those
issues can be dealt with on a case-by-case basis, as long as the
relevant supervisors have enough authority and discretion to deal
with them?
PROFESSOR CARNELL: Ms. Climo outlined a proposal for
an optional federal insurance charter.1" I want to ask the panelists
about the legislative prospects for such a proposal.
Let me provide background. The American Council of Life
Insurance ("ACLI") about two years ago started talking about how
they might be exploring this issue." In fact, another way to look at
part of what impelled the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act" is as a
response to a fear in the insurance industry that if there was not
legislation, the national bank charter might become the de facto
optional federal insurance charter, which the insurance industry
did not see as producing the kind of playing field they had in mind.
Given the culture and history exemplified in the McCarran-
Ferguson Act,"~ which says there will be no federal regulation of
105. See Brostoff, supra at 87 and accompanying text (explaining and outlining
the proposed insurance charter).
106. See Federal Charter Amongst Life Insurers' Options, INS. AccouNT., Apr.
10, 2000, at 1 [hereinafter Federal Charter] (explaining that the ACLI had been
working on a study for two years, concluding that there was a need for
improvements in the state-based regulatory system).
107. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Services Modernization Act, Pub. L. No.
106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999) (codified in scattered sections of 12 and 15 U.S.C.).
108. 15 U.S.C. § 1012 (2000).
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insurance as such," for the ACLI to broach the idea of an optional
federal charter is sort of like the Dalai Lama broaching the idea of
becoming a Southern Baptist. Against the background of the
changes that have occurred so far, but still keeping in mind the
large changes that would be required for this to happen, what are
the legislative prospects for an optional federal insurance charter?
MP, SMITH: As I often sit at tables with agents and
companies from around the country. I would say insurance is still
very much a state-regulated business. There is very strong
presence in the construction of the insurance provisions of the
federal law to preserve the state regulatory system. I think you are
right, Professor Carnell, in the comments preceding your question.
I think that if there were federal regulation of insurance at the
front end, not unlike deposit insurance in interstate banking, it
would be controversial.
MS. SCHAEFER: I agree. I think it is a debate that will
happen, and it will occur eventually, but it is a long-term issue. I
do not think it is something you will see in the near term.
PROFESSOR CARNELL: Is this still too hot to touch right
now?
MS. SCHAEFER: Yes.
PROFESSOR CARNELL: Not just too hot to pass, but too
hot to touch?
MS. SCHAFFER: Yes. The industry is beginning to come out
and say, "We have these ideas, we'd like to sit down and talk to
people," but it is at its very initial stages of floating the ideas.
MR. RUTLEDGE: I do think that Ms. Climo raised a very
good point in her remarks, that just the discussion of the possibility
of a federal charter has some implications for the way in which the
states perform their activities. In the course of the last couple of
years, in some ways, I have been extremely impressed by the work
of the NAIC. They have quarterly meetings where they bring
together supervisors from across the country into very heavily
structured, very rigorous sessions to discuss how to develop
109. Id. § 1012(b) ("No Act of Congress shall be construed to invalidate,
impair, or supersede any law enacted by any State for the purpose of regulating
the business of insurance ..... ).
110. See NAIC Agenda, supra note 91 and accompanying text.
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approaches to insurance supervision that can be adopted across the
Fifty States. The fact that they are doing this in such a way shows
what a challenge it is to get fifty parties together to work out issues.
I think, with the debate going on about the possibility of
federal chartering, it puts even more pressure on the organizations
to try to work together and hammer out differences so that there
still can be some measure of creativity exercised by individual state
supervisors, but with enough consistency of approach that maybe
the issue gets somewhat downplayed.
PROFESSOR CARNELL: It is worth noting that the
legislation incorporates an exercise like that in a somewhat more
limited area. There is the National Association of Registered
Agents and Brokers (the "NARAB"),"' and Gramm-Leach-
Bliley1z also sets up a system under which federal regulation will
occur unless certain criteria are met.' Therefore, the legislation is
sort of setting a deadline and a process that will then presumably
galvanize the insurance people for a solution of their own.
MR. SMITH: Also too, Professor Carnell, I do not think it was
emphasized in the earlier panel, but on privacy issues, the
insurance regulators are mandated by the Statute to put together
regulations."" They will be promulgating those in short order.
That can be significant. Even though it applies just to insurance
companies under the financial services holding company, there are
profound implications for banks and for securities firms. Further,
in the New York State statute in the safe harbors, there is the
ability to deal with opt-in on medical information and such things,
which we are very much familiar with here in New York. So the
insurance regulators still have a tremendous amount of authority
111. regulatory system).
111. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Services Modernization Act, Pub. L. No.
106-102, § 322, 113 Stat. 1338 (establishing the National Association of
Registered Agents and Brokers).
112. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Services Modernization Act, Pub. L. No.
106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999) (codified in scattered sections of 12 and 15 U.S.C.).
113. See id. § 114 (providing that the Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation may impose restrictions or requirements by
regulation or order on certain entities if such agencies make certain findings).
114. Id. § 505 (a)-(b).
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even as it relates to the privacy regulations.
MS. CLIMO: I think how the insurance industry implements
that will have a lot to say with respect to whether they really are
going to be able to go towards nationalization and uniformity,
which is what this NARAB provision in the Gramm-Leach-Bliley
Act' 5 tries to encourage, because if they do not follow what the
federal agencies have done and essentially implement the
previously instituted rules and they go in a patchwork, I think that
is when you will start seeing the ACLV'5 and American Insurance
Association (the "AIA") react."7 Even though they are talking in
the back room about it, I think that will be a very telling sign, if
they cannot get it done even at that level.
PROFESSOR CARNELL: A question? Mr. Larry Uhlick.
MR. UHLICK: Could Ms. Climo just elaborate more on the
mandatory insurance provisions? It is one thing to have an option
for a federal insurance charter. It is another thing, if I understood
you correctly, to have mandatory coverage of insurance liabilities
by a federal agency. Is that what we are talking about here?
MS. CLIMO: You mean the National Association of
Registered Agents and Brokers?
PROFESSOR CARNELL: No, the insurance guarantee fund.
QUESTIONER: Are we talking about an FDIC kind of model
for the insurance industry?
MS. CLIMO: Yes.
QUESTIONER: Would that be pre-funded coverage of all
liabilities?
MS. CLIMO: You have a state guarantee fund in each state
for the insurance business today. The new model would essentially
be the substitute for that, but it would emist at the federal level. It
115. Id. § 322 (establishing the National Association of Registered Agents and
Brokers).
116. See generally Federal Charter, supra note 106 and accompanying text
(discussing the ACLI's recent efforts in improving the state-based regulatory
system).
117. See Steven Brostoff, Financial Services Groups Unite For Functional
Regulation, NAT. UNDERVaTER, Feb. 10, 1997, at 3 (stating that major
insurance, securities and banking associations, including the ACLI, announced
strong collective support for broad financial services legislation based on
functional regulation).
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would cover the entire industry, as opposed to current state-by-
state coverage. Again, I do not know how well those funds work,
but an analogy exists to when there were state insurance funds for
the banking industry. We saw a couple of those-Maryland and
Ohio-I believe they were, "belly-up" is not quite the right word,
but they went by the wayside, as did some S&L insurance funds.
The concept is to have a federal insurer go with the federal charter.
We have opted to mirror the dual banking system and have the
insurance cover all entities irrespective of whether they are state or
federally chartered. Again, these are all what I consider to be
details. As other groups start working on similar proposals, they
may have different ways of addressing those details, and we are
very open to all suggestions, of course.
PROFESSOR CARNELL: Within computer science, people
speak of something called Moore's Law.118 Moore's Law is a name
for the phenomenon under which the price of computing power
falls by half every eighteen months.119 This has held true for
decades. When you think about compounding a fall like that again
and again, the results are extraordinary. That is why any personal
computer produced in the last few years has more computing
power than the NASA computers that sent people around the
moon years ago, far more.
So if you carry this phenomenon to its logical conclusion, it
suggests that the cost of transmitting and processing data will
approach zero. Now, financial services to a significant degree
involve processing data. Does this phenomenon suggest pressure
for a dramatic end to intermediation in financial services, that is,
for those who have capital to provide and those who want to
borrow or otherwise receive financial services to connect up with
each other through markets at the expense of the diminution in the
role of more traditional financial institutions? This connects to the
question of whether the Internet will commoditize financial
118. See Art Wittman, Feeding Moore's Law, NETWORK COMPUTING, Dec. 27,
1999 (discussing how Gordon Moore in 1965, one of the founders of Intel,
charted the increasing density of transistors housed on a single microchip and
noted that the number doubled every 18 months, leading to the coining of
"Moore's Law").
119. Id.
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services, although it is putting the question in even more radical
form.
MS. SCHAFFER: Actually, I read an article from CBS
MarketWatch. It concerns connecting with B2B software stocks.
Specifically, it discusses an interview of an analyst from CS First
Boston who talked about these marketplaces bringing sellers and
buyers together. The interesting thing is that he asked, who was in
a position to give these companies a run for their money? The
analyst said the other alternative would be for banks to get into
this business. He talked about the need of getting credit to small
businesses and providing a marketplace to do it.
It struck me that this is something about which, while not
exactly approved under Gramm-Leach-Bliley,' the OCC has
opinions. The OCC says a national bank can act as a finder putting
together a buyer and a seller." One could argue that these
marketplaces are very similar in concept and why shouldn't they be
approved for a financial subsidiary or for a holding company. I do
not know if that is exactly what Professor Carnell is talking about,
but it is fascinating.
PROFESSOR CARNELL: I invite views on the likelihood of
this.
MR. RUTLEDGE: I think it is without question that advances
in technology will allow various current barriers to seemingly break
down. Geographic barriers will unequivocally break down; they
already have, to a very significant extent.' The barriers between
what constitutes financial services and what is the provision of
other dnds of services, as was just discussed, could well also break
down.
I think the question for banking organizations is, how can they
harness the technology to aid their delivery of products, their
reaching out, and provision of services to their customers? We
have seen a number of banking organizations that have made the
big investment in technology and have made it in a somewhat
120. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Senrices Modernization Act, Pub. L. No.
106-102,113 Stat. 1338 (1999) (codified in scattered sections of 12 and 15 U.S.C.).
121. 12 C.F.R. § 7.1002 (2001); see id. § 7.1002(b) (excluding activities that
would characterize the bank as a broker under applicable federal law).
122. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
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specialized dimension. They have made a choice. They made a
choice to be the big processing firm. They made a choice to
become, in effect, an investment banking firm. They have targeted
a particular set of customers, tried to understand what array of
services those customers want, and make sure that they deliver the
platforms so they can more effectively serve those customers.
They have certain built-in advantages. Maybe some of these
advantages are eroding. But if they build upon the various
technologies that may be available and have an appropriate
strategy, I think it can be a positive for banking organizations,
rather than necessarily leading to their erosion of market share and
customer base.
Mr. SMITH: Commenting on the pricing, I would not go so far
as to try to predict how institutions are going to price down the
road. When people talk about the Internet, it is a little bit like, if
you remember twenty-five years ago, when people talked about
home banking. Chemical Bank had to drop home banking because
they could not get anyone to sign up. Currently, Internet banking
is at the front end.
I think there are two critical elements to the implementation
of technology. One, there needs to be consumer and business
acceptance. Actually, there needs to be customer acceptance of
the technology. Obviously, there is a lot going into the branding of
that technology. Second, there needs to be clarity about the topics
raised today. What are the legal and regulatory compliance issues?
What will they be? If you go the route that some advocates would
take on the privacy provisions, obviously that might have profound
impacts on the Internet system. I think it is probably too early to
tell whether Moore's Law is going to remain in the economics
books or wherever it exists.
PROFESSOR CARNELL: You are suggesting a sunset on
Moore's Law. During the 1980s, bank regulators developed a
practice of treating large banks as "too big to fail," in the sense that
the FDIC would provide 100 percent protection to all depositors,
even those over the $100,000 limit." We saw that in 1984, when
Continental Illinois, the largest bank in the country at the time, was
123. See 12 U.S.C. § 1821(a)(1)(B) (2000) (limiting FDIC protection to
$100,000).
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in effect rescued, together with its holding company. ' By the end
of the decade, the FDIC was protecting uninsured depositors at
banks with less than $1 billion in assets. In 1991, in the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act (the
"FDICIA"),r Congress sought to curtail that practice, and so, for
example, it required the FDIC to follow the least-cost effective
approach to resolving a failing institution' and it did establish a
narrow systemic risk exception,.'r which has not in fact been used.
But since then there has been a lot of consolidation within the
banking industry, and the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act' should
facilitate additional consolidation between banks and other
financial services firms. So what is the outlook for the government
extending formal or informal support for financial institutions that
get into trouble, whether they be depository institutions or
affiliated financial firms?
MR. RUTLEDGE: I think it is a bit of a misnomer to refer to
the doctrine of "too big to fail." I have long thought of it as much
more "too big to fail in a disruptive manner," that even in the
largest situations, the typical situation has been that equity holders
have been wiped out and that a number of debt holders in many
instances have also suffered losses.
I think the challenge for us as supervisors, and particularly the
Federal Reserve, which functions as an umbrella supervisor, is to
be mindful of the systematic implications arising from the
implementation of activities by various organizations. When
problems arise, however, knowledge of inter-organizational
relationships, specifically large organizations and other key players
in financial markets, are crucial. This vil facilitate a more
effective understanding and management of the knock off effects
of participants in other organizations. I do think that part of our
124. See generally FDIC May Swallow $1.7 Billion Loss on Illinois Bank
Loans, THE J. REC., Dec. 31, 1986.
125. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act, Pub. L. No.
102-242, 105 Stat. 2236 (1991) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5, 12
and 15 U.S.C.).
126. Id. § 141 (requiring the least-cost resolution).
127. Id.
128. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Services Modernization Act, Pub. L. No.
106-102,113 Stat. 1338 (1999) (codified in scattered sections of 12 and 15 U.S.C.).
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role is to make sure that tremendous systemic disruptions do not
occur. At the same time, we have to continue to press for the right
kind of market incentives so that organizations do recognize that
there is a downside to taking overly risky strategies.
MS. SCHAFFER: The people on the first panel talked about
the requirements of Gramm-Leach-Bliley 29 for a bank to be well-
capitalized and well-managed, and I think to some extent that was
Congress's response to part of this question. The thought was that
if you write legislation that encourages affiliations and you are not
going to extend the safety net, you need to make the institutions
that are under the safety net stronger. I am sure that they are
stronger. I think that, while there was a lot of criticism of some of
those requirements and the cure proceedings, there was a desire on
the part of Congress, first, to not extend the safety net, and,
second, to make the institutions stronger under the net.
MR. SMITH: I argue that, rather than FDICIA being tested,
maybe it is working, and maybe because there have not been any
failures, God forbid, that the trip wires that were put in FDICIA
actually have acted as a safeguard.
Also, it is my understanding, at least from the FDIC, that if
there were a failure, that the largest institutions would have to
share in paying for the replenishment of the insurance fund, so
there is a self-policing mechanism. So I think that the feeling is,
while there is a concern about, and there is always mention of, "too
big to fail," enough safeguards have been put into place, enough
safeguards that, hopefully, will never have to be used.
PROFESSOR CARNELL: We will have a better sense when
we have gone through a full economic cycle with the safeguards in
place. Let me ask the impossible question. Well, I will tell you the
question I was going to ask and then I will ask a watered-down
version of it. The question I was going to ask is, what do you
predict the biggest policy issues in financial services will be ten
years from now? Now, nobody knows that, or at least I think that
would be very difficult to know, so I am just going to ask you what
129. Id.
130. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act, Pub. L. No.
102-242, 105 Stat. 2236 (1991) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5, 12
and 15 U.S.C.).
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you think the biggest policy issues in financial services .All be five
years from now.
MR. SMITH: Eighteen months?
MS. CLIIO: If Ms. Schaffer's boss has his way, they will still
be talking about the fact that we should not be mixing banking and
commerce. That is probably an issue for the next three to five
years.
MS. SCHAFFER: Depending where the economy is, and if
there is a downturn, depending what its impact will be, I think
eventually-I do not know if it is going to be five years from now-
we will get to the issue of regulatory consolidation and how to
address the fact that at the federal level we have four bank
regulators, a securities regulator, possibly an insurance regulator,
the Commodity Futures Trading CommissionM -I mean, we have a
lot of financial regulators. One debate is whether this represents a
strength or a weakness. Is there a way of addressing it? I do not
know if it is going to be five years or ten years, but I think
eventually that issue will be addressed.
MR. RUTLEDGE: I do think, and I am not sure whether it is
five years or some different time period, that the issue that was
alluded to a moment ago of what exactly financial activities are and
what constitutes commercial activities unequivocally has to be
addressed. That line is going to be blurred by behavior within the
industry. Congress has typically reacted to changing market
behavior by seeking to rationalize what has evolved through
creative lawyering and creative business decisions. So I anticipate
that there will be a policy issue refocused on what constitutes that
dividing line.
MR. SMITH: We get taught to think in twvo-year cycles, but if
history is the judge, it will not be as galactic as we may think. We
will probably still be living with the implementation of this law.
Concerning Mr. Rutledge's point, the big debate now occurring is
the regulations on merchant banking. Quite frankly, merchant
banking can be a mix of banking, commerce, and the investing in
131. See Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act of 1974, Pub. L. No.
93-463, 88 Stat. 1389 (2001) (establishing the Commodity Futures Trading
Commission to enforce the Commodity Exchange Act, 42 Stat. 993 (1929), 7
U.S.C. § 1, et seq.).
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firms. Therefore, in the next couple of years, I say that we will
probably still be talking about many of the things that we are
talking about today.
PROFESSOR CARNELL: Ms. Climo, any comments?
MS. CLIMO: I put my money on banking and commerce, that
with the Internet and such, just as now we cannot tell the
difference between a banking, insurance and a securities product,
probably five years from now we will not know if it is a commercial
product or service, or a financial product or service. So we will
have the same debate, but at a different level.
PROFESSOR CARNELL: I will contribute one subversive
thought. My panelists assume a system in which the largest issues
are going to involve conventional privately owned firms that
borrow money on the strength of their own capital and financial
strength. I note that we have a number of large financial
institutions in the United States-Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and
the Federal Home Loan Bank System, in particular-that raise
capital based on the market perception that they are the U.S.
Government in disguise.32 They have a cost of funds that is close
to that of the U.S. Treasury, which enables them to borrow money
even at a cheaper cost than the triple-A-rated " fully private firms.
These healthy, growing gorillas are, as one person has pointed out,
growing a good deal faster than the cage that contains them. In a
market environment that puts a huge emphasis on earnings
momentum, they are going to have to look for a lot more room to
grow, or else they will face the market consequences with their
stocks. Further, a candidate for a future policy issue is the extent
to which these so-called government-sponsored enterprises will
dominate the financial services sector.
13Z See Patriot, Inc. v. U.S. Hous. And Urban Dev., 963 F. Supp. 1, 15
(D.D.C. 1997) (stating that the plaintiffs incorrectly cited cases that involve
government agencies, notwithstanding that Fannie Mae is a "private
corporation").
133. An "AAA" rating by Standard & Poor's indicates that an obligor has an
"extremely strong" capacity to meet its financial commitments. See
http://www.standardandpoors.com/ResourceCenter/IssCreLT.html (last visited
Apr. 4,2001) (listing S&P long-term issuer credit ratings).
